The Bomber Need Not Always Get Through

 

 

Breaking the Will of the Enemy

 

Surprisingly, the phrase ‘the bomber will always get through’ was made not by an airman but by a seasoned and successful three-time British Prime Minister. In his 1932 speech, "A Fear for the Future", Stanley Baldwin, 1st Earl Baldwin of Bewdley, warned the British parliament that a strategic bombing campaign would destroy a country's cities and ‘kill large numbers of men and women’, breaking the ‘will of a people to fight’ leading to ultimate victory.

 

This was in consonance with the classic Air Power theorists of the early part of the 20^th Century. They too were almost of the same opinion that in a ‘total war’ against the enemy state, offensive air operations with extensive use of bombing campaigns would break the will of the enemy state. While there was considerable difference on the targets, Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchel were in near total agreement on employing long-range heavy bombers delivering ordnance in mass.

 

Obscurity for the Bomber

 

Bombing Campaigns

 

The studies of the bombing campaigns through the ages reveal that ‘the bomber did not always get through’. Whilst the development of radar gave fore warning of incoming raids, severe attrition was caused by enemy fighters and AAA (Anti-Aircraft Artillery). Difficulties in navigation and inaccuracy due to rudimentary sighting systems required a very large Over Target Requirement (OTR). The Luftwaffe’s bombing campaign of London did not break ‘the will of the people’ and instead steeled their resolve to fight back. A 1964 British study of V bombers indicated that unprotected bombers would encounter 6 AAMs,(Air to Air Missiles) each with a 75% probability of destruction. A similar result came from a USAF study on the efficacy of bombers versus missiles (msl).

 

Bombing campaigns in general and the bomber in particular seemed to be headed for obscurity.

 

Shock and Awe

 

That obscurity reigned until the coming together of the technologies of intelligence gathering, precision targeting, stealth and SEAD, and perhaps more importantly, an operational level concept. The result was Operation Desert Storm. This operational concept focused principally on ‘effects’ to achieve and exert ‘control’ over an opponent, rather than destruction to achieve military objectives. Col John Warden used this near perfect opportunity to lay the foundation for a complete reversal of the disastrous Rolling Thunder of the Vietnam era with Instant Thunder; a campaign to target the Five Rings of the Centres of Gravity (CoG) of Saddam’s regime. As then Brig Gen David A Deptula wrote “The first night of the Gulf War air campaign demonstrated that the conduct of war had changed. One hundred fifty-two discrete targets—plus regular Iraqi Army forces and SAM (Surface to Air Msl) sites—made up the master attack plan for the opening 24-hour period of the Gulf air war. The Gulf War began with more targets in one day’s attack plan than the total number of targets hit by the entire Eighth Air Force in all of 1942 and 19434—more separate target air attacks in 24 hours than ever before in the history of warfare.”

 

Parallel warfare had arrived.

 

Some Thoughts on Strategy and Effects

 

Strategy and Tactics

 

A bomber traditionally has always been a multi-engine long-range aircraft that could deliver heavy ordnance. So, when does it become strategic?

 

The term ‘strategy’ has been perennially concerned with operations at a markedly different level from tactics. Carl Von Clausewitz wrote six volumes and two drafts for his treatise ‘On War’. Had he lived to complete this classic, he would perhaps have elaborated more on strategy. As it is, Clausewitz has very little to say about this even in Book Three on strategy. Strategy, he defines baldly as "the use of the engagement for the purposes of the war".

 

Technological advancements in aviation have blurred the differences between strategy and tactics considerably. Gen Charles A. Horner, the JACC (Joint Air Component Commander) during Op Desert Storm put this quite simply, “I don’t understand tactical or strategic. The words have now become meaningless and dysfunctional. In fact, in modern military speech, they are more often used to divide people and frustrate efforts than to illuminate and facilitate.”

Closer home, the Basic Doctrine of the IAF published in 2012, defines strategy as the process of coordinating the development, deployment, and employment of military forces to achieve national security objectives.

 

The IAF understands strategy and Effect Focussed Operations only too well even if it doesn’t articulate it elaborately. On 14 Dec 1971, IAF struck the Governor’s House in Dacca, with four MiG 21 and two Hunter aircrafts. Firing 128 rockets and guns, it terrorised the East Pakistan leadership into surrender. The innermost ring of Command, Control and Leadership had been struck and forced to capitulate.

As can be seen, a weapon and a platform can be strategic or tactical. What matters is the effect.

Current Heavy Bombers

 

Only three nations operate heavy bombers today. USAF has its B-52 Stratofortress, B-1B and B-2 aircrafts. Russia operates the Tu-22, Tu-160 and the Tu-195 while PRC (People’s Republic of China) operates several versions of the Tu-16 designating it as versions of H-6; H-6 K being the latest version.

 

All other Air Forces operate the fighter bomber or multi-role fighter jets.

 

Bombers versus Missiles

 

Comparisons between penetrating bombers and expendable missiles are inevitable. While public perception favours missiles and this is a view often shared by some in the military, Project AIR FORCE (RAND) carried out a study that was starkly revealing.

 

The Project developed life cycle costs estimates (including procurement, operations, and support) for a new bomber. This included the per day cost of fighting multiple conflicts against adversaries possessing moderate air defences. The project also developed cost estimates of long-range cruise missile design launched from standoff distances by non-stealthy platforms.  The project did not include the procurement costs for the missile launch platforms. It also assumed that cruise missiles do not require more ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) support than bombers. Both of these factors worked in the favour of the cost analysis of missiles.

 

Project Air Force’s calculations showed that if a nation fights under these conditions for 20 days or more, over the next 30 years, penetrating stealth bombers cost less than expendable missiles for similar missions.

 

The Future Bombers

 

USA

 

Budgets force a nation to allocate its monies judiciously. USAF will induct the B-21 Raider (named after the famous Doolittle Raid) in the next decade. To be built at a staggering cost of US$ 550 million apiece with a staggering US$ 100 billion-dollar R&D budget, the B 21 will be a long-range, highly survivable bomber capable of carrying a mix of conventional and nuclear ordnance.

 

Russia

 

The Tupolev Design Bureau is currently developing a long range stealthy subsonic heavy bomber called PAK DA codenamed Poslannik (Envoy). While a full-scale wooden mock-up has been revealed, there is considerable criticism in the West whether Russia will have the resources to continue this programme. This is in light of the economic sanctions due to the Ukraine crisis.

 

PRC

 

PRC is working on inducting its newest and most powerful bomber, the H-20. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) describes the bomber as being a heavy and stealthy plane, capable of flying across the Pacific with a 45-ton weapon payload. The SCMP quotes sources in China as saying the bomber will have a range of at least 12,000 kilometres, which would even put Hawaii within its reach.

 

 

 

Threat Perception according to India

 

The PRC’s paramount consideration in the use of force has been whether it advances or protects China’s vital national interests. Analysis reveals that PRC uses armed force for three fundamental reasons.

The first is to defend its vital national interests. To elaborate, it seeks to protect sovereignty, safeguard and advance territorial claims, or promote national unification. This rationale is evident from China’s actions vis-à-vis Taiwan and in the East and South China seas.

The next reason is to signal deterrence or coercion to an adversary. Across decades, China has made sustained efforts to coerce Taiwan towards unification and not pursue independence. PRC’s often attempts to “teach a lesson” to its adversary. This was the clear logic of the 1962 war with India.  

The third and perhaps last reason is for non-warfighting operations. The prime example is Beijing’s decision to increase its participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

The PRC used force judiciously. Beijing strategically embraces the measured application of force, whereas operationally, the PLA attempts mass concentration of force to achieve overwhelming superiority at the point of attack. Prime examples of this are Doklam and Galwan.

Bomber Flights

In September 2013, a PLA naval aviation H-6 bomber flew past the First Island Chain for the first time, while the air force began sending its H-6 K variant on overwater training missions in March 2015, including some that circumnavigated Taiwan. Chinese air force overwater bomber training flights are a linchpin of China’s development of a “strategic air force” that can conduct offshore missions for deterrent and warfighting purposes and provide valuable training for Chinese pilots to simulate raids on key targets. By leveraging a mix of PLA doctrinal publications and publicly reported flight details, PLAAF concepts of “bomber strike packages” are discernible.

Threat from PLAAF Bombers

 

PLAAF operates three Bomber Air Divisions (8^th, 10^th. & 36^th) of the H-6 (Tu-16 Badger) medium bomber. All bomber aircraft of PLAAF are called Hong meaning bomber or fire or even fury. Each division has two regiments of two squadrons of ten aircraft each.  Each regiment must also have a training squadron of CJ-6 trainers, as per PLAAF SOP.

H-6 bombers and tankers have operated together three times in 2002. Hence, it is very well possible that some H-6 can be refuelled. 

PLAAF has based most of its H-6 aircraft catering for the Taiwan, Russian and US contingencies. However, a few have also been based at Kashgar and Hotan to cater to our border conflict. In an attempt to posture, Chinese media showed an H-6 flight over the Himalayas, one that was easily called out as fake.

That said the H-6 K has impressive capabilities. Its powerplant is the new Soloviev D-30KP-2 turbofan engines. The cabin was replaced with a radome. Composite materials have been used reducing its weight. The newest version has significantly improved avionics, search and attack radar, navigation, fire control, and weapon precision capabilities. The aircraft has ejection seats reportedly for all four crew members. With a combat radius of 3500 km, armed with ALCMs, the H-6 K has a combat range of almost 5000 km. It is also capable of being armed with a mix of up to 12 tons of free fall bombs or 6 LGBs of the Luoyang Electro-Optics Technology (LT) Precision Guided Bomb (PGB) class.

This brings all of the Indian sub-continent within its combat range whilst still being within its air defended zone.

IAF has developed measures to counter this using a mix of Airborne assets and Ground Based Guided Weapons. The elaboration is beyond the scope of this article.

Options for India

 

Brief History of IAF Bombers

 

The first ever bombing operations in IAF were carried out by the legendary Jumbo Majumdar against the Japanese in WW II. IAF’s professionalism and gallantry stood out during the war resulting in it being bestowed the ‘Royal’ title.

 

Be that as it may, the British were not inclined to induct bombers into the RIAF given their distrust and animosity to Indian ambitions of building an Air Force. Whilst leaving India, the RAF attempted to destroy the Consolidated B-24 Liberators that it was operating in India. Post-Independence, IAF’s engineers did a remarkable job restoring the abandoned and severely damaged B-24 Liberators. Sixteen aircraft were restored and 5 Squadron IAF was raised.

 

The British also influenced IAF political leadership against procuring bombers. Prof PMS Blackett was an important member of Britain’s Operation Research Organisation that carried out significant improvements in raising combat effectiveness. Appointed as an Advisor to the Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru, he advocated strongly against procuring and operating bombers. The use of bombers by IAF would invite swift and strong retribution, he advised.

In the 1950s, the Soviet Union offered the Ilyushin IL-28. The fact that this deal didn’t materialise would return to haunt us in 1962. PLAAF acquired this very same IL-28 in the 50s. Under fear of PLAAF attacking Indian cities with these very IL-28 bombers, the Indian leadership refused to use the IAF in an offensive role. IAF leadership also did not cover itself in glory and acquiesced to this ignominy.

Less than a decade later, India acquired the English Electric Canberra 54 B (I) bombers. The Canberras were consigned to reconnaissance missions in 1962. They were employed in airfield attack as well as interdiction missions in both the Indo-Pak wars. Strangely, after the Canberras moved to other roles, IAF never pursued procurement of bombers. It instead went for the fighter strike way. But more on that later.

Why Doesn’t IAF have a Contemporary Bomber?

Perhaps, the single most important reason is financial resources. Our political relations with the USA and erst while Soviet Union also influenced thought and thinking.

The IAF was born as a small tactical Air Force. The induction of the DPSA Jaguar in 1979 was its first attempt to acquire long range strike capability. The subsequent induction of the MiG 23 BN and the MiG 27 in 1984-85 added to IAF’s strike capability. Perhaps the greatest fillip came with the induction of the multi role Su-30.

That said, there are ideological issues as well. The IAF leadership takes immense pride in being fighter pilots and rightly so. But even life-long dedicated FSL qualified pilots will introduce themselves as fighter pilots. And while several Jaguar pilots have reached the apex, associating themselves with the less glamorous role of bombing would border on anathema.

Advantages of a Bomber Force

The advantages of having a dedicated bomber force are immense and only too obvious.

A legacy long-range heavy bomber operates with a crew of say 4 or five members. This includes a pilot, co-pilot, a navigator/bombardier, flight engineer and an observer. With an armament of around 15 tons and/or up to eight ALCMs, it can deliver a potent amount of ordnance. This would reduce the OTR for any strategic targets. It is extremely costly to train a fighter pilots as compared to other crew. The cost benefits of using bombers as against only strike aircraft are obvious.

There are other important effects of having such a strategic asset. PLAAF over water bomber flights have resulted in Japan having to maintain 24/7 Operation readiness Platforms of interceptors. In our context, PLAAF would have to maintain such ORPs as well even in its rear bases.

If we possess a bomber fleet that is capable of striking the TAR rail hubs, or Logistical nodes in the interior or PLAAF rear bases, there will be a need for PLAAF to reorganise their assets and bases.

Developing a Bomber

No nation sells a bomber aircraft. That is with the exception of the erstwhile USSR and the present Russian Federation. Indian aviation design and development are nowhere near designing and developing a contemporary long-range stealth bomber. It is suggested that for the interim period IAF must acquire two squadrons of 10 aircraft each.

There is a lot of commonality between developing a bomber and an airliner. India must develop these capabilities. The staggering cost of development would then be shared between these two programmes. The programmes must also involve other nations such as Japan and South Korea who share similar concerns.

There is considerable experience within India for equipping the bomber with avionics, and protection suites. The wealth of knowledge gained during the development of the Tejas will serve us well. Added to this is our knowledge and experience in developing and producing air launched cruise missiles of the BrahMos class. Using a platform such as a heavy bomber, the next generation of Indian ALCMs could very well reach 1500 km.

This would mean that the Bomber Force while remaining within own air defended zone would not need to go through enemy air defended zones and still strike their vital and strategic targets.

The bomber need not always go through.

Operating the Bomber

IAF has for the past 15 years developed and refined tactics for large force packages and engagements. It has honed its procedures and tactics for defending and protecting its Flight Refueller Aircraft and AWACs. These exercises have involved most leading airpowers of the world and have been evaluated in great detail.  Therefore, the expertise and experience in protecting and escorting a bomber is available.

A heavy bomber has considerable ECM capability since by design there is electrical power and space to house and operate AI/ML enabled Radar Warning Receivers and software enabled agile Jammers. In addition, the bombers would have additional EW Escorts, Air Defence Escorts, Decoys, and UAVs. Finally, there would be BDA aircraft and/or UAV.

Conclusion

The answer to the question that should IAF have a dedicated long range bomber force is a resounding yes. The devil lies as always in the details. Convey’s Time Management Matrix brings us some measure of understanding. The Indian political leadership is perpetually occupied with priorities that are of a more-immediate nature. In such a scenario, a long-term procurement often takes a back seat. However, IAF cannot wash its hands of this important issue. The dark days of 1962 must never visit us again. It must strive to convince the leadership of the need to allocate resources and procure this vital strategic asset.

So, the answer to the question that will we ever get the dedicated long range bomber force must also be a resounding yes.

My NDA Entrance

Ever since I can remember, all I ever wanted was to become a fighter pilot. I learnt in my early teens that the surest and fastest route to becoming one was through NDA. And so, I joined the 73^rd NDA in the January of 1985.

 But then I am running ahead of myself. So please indulge in me as I lay the background for this.

 My first motivation to become a fighter pilot came from my father and his colleagues. Dad was a Navigator in the IAF and had flown eight combat missions on the venerable Canberra in 1965 Ops. Many an evening did I spend as a young boy listening to him and his mates recount their war stories. They, of course, scarcely needed the encouragement which I provided in abundance. The names of the Pak airbases that they struck were enshrined in my young mind forever. Mauripur, Sargodha, Peshawar (always pronounced with an Anglo-Indian accent as ‘PayshaWere’), Chor; I knew about them way before I knew most Indian cities.

 The fact that I wore the khaki uniform as a seven-year-old boy in Grade III of Stanes High School helped. It was the same colour and fabric as the then-IAF uniform. At age ten or eleven I would don my father’s overalls and pose for pictures which my sister would click. I even learnt to stand in the classic pose and swagger with the helmet on my hip. Dad’s mates loved it and would even loan me their precious Rayban Aviators.

 In my 8^th standard, I joined the Junior Wing of NCC. The trips to Kalaikunda were particularly exciting for we would see the mighty Sabre-Killer, the Gnat in action. All heady stuff. I enjoyed the entire training; the drill, firing the 0.22 and even the 0.303. I won a shooting competition as well and Dad gave me an air gun as a present.

 In time I joined Bangalore Military School. Again, the khaki beckoned, and I was on a roll. Life at BMS was a mixed bag. There was a lot of bullying, ragging, and some unmentionable stuff that goes on in boys boarding schools. But I am grateful that the school encouraged me to play all sports. I won medals in cross-country, football, athletics, and even book prizes in debate and elocution. I learnt and participated in boxing, a love that has lasted a lifetime. I will always have tremendous respect for our teachers and coaches at BMS. Students of the XI^th and 12^th standards regularly joined NDA. These seniors would come back to school and address all juniors in the Assembly Hall. It was mesmerizing. They spoke of the fantastic infrastructure, the immaculate layout, boxing, cross-country, games, and the amazing food; it was enough to make me besotted. My only desire from now onwards was to join NDA.

 For various reasons, I left BMS and joined Kendriya Vidyalaya Shillong. My father was serving as the Ops II C, handling helicopter operations in Eastern Air Command. If I recall correctly, he had to work a lot with the Command Ops Room. Young officers who had bounced fighter flying would man the Ops Room in shifts round the clock. Dad was always quite popular with them as he was a great host, and my mother always laid a superb table. Most of these officers were ex-NDAs and I would listen to their tales in rapt attention.

 Having finished my XI^th, I broached the subject of the NDA Entrance Examination. Incidentally, I wasn’t aware that I could have applied six months earlier. Nevertheless, I went ahead. My mother was not at quite against it but Dad was delighted. A JWO who worked under my father got the application form; his son who was undergoing graduation was also going to appear. We filled it up and there I was ready to go. However, I hadn’t foreseen my father’s fervour. This JWO would recount to my father how his son was burning both ends of the candle whilst preparing for the exam. He would elaborate on the vast amount of material that his son had accumulated. How it was his third attempt and how tough the exam was going to be, and how stiff the competition was. In contrast, there was me. I had done nothing to prepare for the exam. My father would blow his top. He would see me and yell, “Awamanam!”. This is a pretty descriptive word to describe everything that a father feels for his prodigal son. Disappointment, the looming loss of face, societal embarrassment, I am sure you get the drift.  

 Now, please don’t get me wrong. I didn’t take the exam lightly. I simply didn’t know how to prepare. I had gone through the syllabus. It consisted of GK, which was a personal favourite. The academic syllabus of Math, Physics, Chemistry and very little Biology was of IXth and Xth grade standards. I had just cleared my Xth board with distinctions. So, I was quite confident. But this constant graphic description worried me. So off I was dispatched to the JWO’s residence where I met this veteran examinee. Looking at the amount of material he had, I was petrified. There were barely 2 weeks to go. He told me that my preparation was hopeless but was kind enough to motivate me with a “there is always a next time”. In desperation, I went with my father to the Command Reference Library and issued a book that had the question papers of the last five years. That was 10 sets of papers. I went through a few and found them not very daunting. I dismissed this as a case of luck. I felt the papers asked what I knew. So I decided to give it a shot.  

The first exam of the three-day schedule was on 17 May 1984. As time went by, that day became significant for a good many reasons. If I remember correctly the KV School opened on 14 May. I went for three days and was then bunked school for the examination which was held in Shillong City. The venue was the State Auditorium near Ward Lake.

I have always been quite an independent boy. I was brought up in boarding schools where there is zero mollycoddling. So, I worked out a way to go. The JWO’s son, two other seniors from the officers' kids and I would walk up to the Five Mile Point. The Command Unit Ration LP Run was a 3-ton Shaktiman that would route along this place and drop us off at Shillong Bara Bazaar. From there it was a short 15 min walk to the Auditorium. Now, my parents had gone to Nepal a week before. They shopped a lot at Dulabari. Crockery, cutlery, carpets, and all sorts of knick-knacks. They even got all three of us kids a pair of jeans each. I still remember the brand; it was called One-Nine. With brass studs, rivets, a brass zip it looked the part.

So, wearing the new jeans, I swung myself over the tailboard clambering aboard the truck. And it happened. The horror of horrors! The jeans split along the inner seam all the way from the bottom of one leg across the crotch all the way to the other. My 'friends' collapsed laughing. If I think back the situation was comical. But I was in tears, literally. I sat with my legs pressed close together to salvage what little I could of my dignity.

After getting off at Bara Bazaar I bought four packets of safety pins. I then stitched together the trouser flaps with the safety pins. I walked in that way all the way to the auditorium. My eyes were blinded by hot tears as I was sure that everyone was laughing at me. Getting into the Exam Hall, I mumbled to the invigilators. I finished the identification procedure and somehow made my way to my seat and collapsed. A kindly invigilator saw that I was distraught. On getting to know of my predicament he brought a glass of water for me and consoled me. He tried to get me to relax and composed for the exam.

The first paper went in a blur. I think there was a break of about an hour. With my friend, I dashed to the market and found a tailor. The tailor gave me a rag to tie around my waist in a vain attempt at hiding my modesty. He then stitched the jeans. I put them on and tested them for strength by squatting and swinging my legs around. They held and I breathed sighs of relief. 

We then got back to the exam hall. The second paper was like the first. I was unable to concentrate. But I finished the paper and submitted it quite ahead of time. After the others finished up we headed back home. The Shaktiman trundled up and again I swung myself gingerly over the tailboard. The blessed jeans held and I silently but profusely thanked the tailor.

My father was there at home as I walked in. He took one look at my red and swollen eyes and feared the worst. I held back my tears as I related the day's happenings. He had little sympathy as I guess he was maybe more anxious than me about my performance. After a few rounds of 'awamanam', we were done. The next day had two papers on Mathematics. I went through the mechanics having been disappointed with the earlier day's mishappenings. Listening to the other colleagues and their descriptions of the questions and answers, I was very disheartened. The NDA dream just disappeared in a pool of streaming tears and ripped jeans.   

My father soon got posted to Baroda (present-day Vadodara) and we left for that city. I was in my XIIth and was quite distraught at having to change my school. But the domestic problems of staying without my father, my sister being already in a hostel in Vadodara etc made the move inevitable. I joined Kendriya Vidyalaya Harni. The school was boring as compared to Shillong. I gave up on the NDA dream as there was little support at home. 

A month into Vadodara I was aboard yet another Shaktiman that was our school bu. A classmate was waving a copy of the Economic Times that had the NDA entrance exam results. The paper was nearly a month old. . I tried to act casual as I asked for the paper. Since I didn't remember my Candidate Number, I took the paper home. To my absolute delight, I cleared the exam. On making a few enquiries with some ex-NDA officers at the base I realised that I had not received my SSB call letter. They advised me to write to Dholpur House with the details. I received a prompt reply that they had sent two call letters to our Shillong Address that had not been replied to. A last and final call letter was enclosed asking me to report to SSB at Varanasi.

To cut to the chase, I cleared the SSB and the medicals and made it to the merit list getting Air Force as my first choice.

The rest as they say is history. 

On the Use of Punitive Air Strikes

Yes, Pakistan's Army especially its senior leadership needs to be punished. Severely.

It is my ardent belief that our military leadership and our rank and file have always understood this. My first few years in the IAF coincided with the commencement of the ‘War of a Thousand Cuts' (WOATC). My CO was a well-read, articulate officer and an exceptional professional. The Boss had been through a unique career. As No 1 on the list of ETPs to become an astronaut, an ECG abnormality detected in Russia during the training, moved him out of fighters. He then proceeded to command two helicopter units, an Airborne FAC Flight and IAF’s sole Mi-35 Sqn.  He was very Catholic about the need for young officers to develop an understanding of the macro picture. Ruthless about the need for us young ‘Piloos’ to read, discussion on the strategy to counter this WOATC that we faced daily in the valley, was a daily affair. But more about Chakku Mulay some other time.


Our Helicopter Flight subscribed to IDSA and Vayu. Late Air Cmde Jasjit Singh’s books and articles were discussed in great detail and reviews and ppts (the Blackboard Versions) were mandatory. One book that I read was Ravi Rikhye's ‘The War that Never Was’. While I have nothing complimentary to say about that book, the starting few pages made a lasting impression. He wrote an imaginary account of a Mi-25, cutting into Pakistan through Rajauri, with an SF team on board; the target being the Kahuta Nuclear Complex. 

While the fictional strike was a success, in reality, we lost a huge opportunity. Imagine!

This was the time when Col John A Warden published his seminal book ‘The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat’. While seldom acknowledged, this classic treatise on Air War Strategy laid the foundation for the USAF’s Shock and Awe campaign of Desert Storm.

I remember coming across the term Punitive Air Strikes around that time. It has taken us 30 years to use this. Despite seeing the first-hand result of a similar strike of 128 rockets on Government House in Dhaka in 1971.

The problem perhaps lies in our inability to convince the political leadership that the Indian military capability needs to be developed and utilised as an instrument of state policy. The bureaucracy that assists our polity in its constant ‘Election Mode Governance’ is perhaps the most sinister evil.

We too are blameworthy. Our legendary turf wars between the Army and the Air Force are responsible for a great deal of this. And these two squabbling siblings rarely acknowledge the Navy.

If we look into ourselves, we will find that we have always been reactionary to the Pak military’s upgradation programmes.

The MiG 29 and Mirage 2000 came after PAF acquired F-16.

When the Pakis acquired the AH-1 S, we got 2 x sqns of Attack Helicopters. We need perhaps 10 squadrons and we still have only two (even with the induction of the Apaches). The LCH equipped 116 HU is yet to be weaponised.

I remember Air Cmde Jasjit Singh advocating that the first use of heavy artillery by the Pakis should have been replied to by air strikes. This was way back in the early 90s.

This then is our tragedy.

And so we continue to lose young men, especially officers, who are forced to take unacceptable risks in order to keep our land free and our people secure.

That said, there is an increasingly distasteful trend of veterans foolishly succumbing to either a sickening so-called liberal thought or a distasteful anti-Muslim/Christian view. 

The bureaucracy is very quick to quote Georges Clemenceau saying war is too serious a matter to leave to soldiers. I have always countered with Gen Charles de Gaulle's quote saying politics is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians.

As serving officers, we were advised to always remain politically inactive but to be acutely politically aware. And the way to do that is by good staff work. Read the background on all these issues. Do not blindly believe in Mass Media. Research the issue. Social Media is another demon that needs to be tamed. Fake news is often spread like wildfire.

My request to all of us is to deliberately keep ourselves neutral. Avoid these smart quips. And do not label your brother offrs as Sanghis or bhakts or sickulars or CONgressis.

Jai Hind ki Sena

Grace and Supercession

 If you notice, I have opted for an older version of the spelling. This version is what has been most in vogue, at least in our part of the world. My research reveals that the reason for using this spelling is due to the association with similar words such as intercede or accede.

         If even the spelling of this word has so much of baggage and difference of acceptance, small wonder that supercession has a huge impact on the military. I have known about officers contemplating if not attempting suicide. I have seen Commanding Officers break down in the open. I have witnessed brave gallantry award winners look shell-shocked and lose all sense of purpose.

So have each one of you, those in the military.

         It is difficult for those not in the profession of arms to understand it. Let me try and put it across as simply as I can.

As soldiers, you are taught from the first day that we live, breathe and fight as a team; but always with a leader. You must be that leader. You want to become the Division Cadet Corporal in your first term in NDA Wing. You must become the Squadron Sergeant and you are God if you lead the Passing out Parade as Wing Cadet Captain as a callow lad, all of seventeen.

At the lowest end of the combat chain is the single aircraft multi-crew team, with the captain as the leader. Like the two-man sniper team, with the senior as the leader. All throughout fighting formations and peace establishments right to the Fifth Floor Corner Room with a view of the Rajpath at Vayu Bhawan, there is a team at each stage and there is a leader. You as an officer have to be that leader. At every stage, as you go through your life, you will be a leader.

As you go through your career, the fauj gives you several chances. You make it to a Coy cdr, you get four-ac lead, and you command that patrol boat. Then comes the big daddy of all these jumps. Command of a Combat Unit!

It differs across the three services. For the Army, the cliff edge is the Select Colonel Rank, which will give you command of your battalion. In the Air Force, you have a Command Board as a Wing Commander, and you will be selected to that cherished command of that Mirage Squadron. In the Navy, your superior performance amongst your peers will give you ‘sea-time’ that will pave the way to command a fighting ship. Heady stuff!

But there are limited seats on this bus. If you don’t make it to the next stage, you will not be a leader. That doesn’t mean that you are not good enough. It just means that there was only one gold medal and you didn’t get it. Now you will get a few more chances but the gold medal is not for you. Unfortunately, it also means that you lose the respect associated with being a leader. Passed-over officers get staff jobs, and they do not bring you the respect that is your life breath. It is a curious thing; this respect. It translates into everything in your military life. The jobs you will be entrusted with, the ranks you wear, where you sit, what orders you pass, and most importantly how your juniors look at you.

         In the olden days, once you got superceded, you put in your papers and went home. You walked your dog and if your parents had left you an inheritance, you tilled that land and managed to make ends meet. When you returned for the Battalion Battle Honours Day, the youngsters greeted you with respect. You had left with your honour intact.

However, as life got increasingly complex and expensive, once you got superceded, you continued till you got a pension and then you went home. It was still okay at the Annual Dinner on Air Force Day. After all, you needed that pension.

It wasn’t greener pastures, and it will rarely be greener.

Ask any of the guys who quit early in service, even without a pension. They are the most active in our course groups. They pitch in the maximum for OROP and Veteran Welfare and know that they won’t gain a naya paisa. Several of my coursemates are dollar millionaires, one counts his millions in pounds sterling. They are winners and not sorry losers. They commanded repect for hanging up their boots when they got disillusioned.

You leave the fauj because you can’t bear being treated as an also-ran. Ask an officer the difference of pay between a Flt Lt or a Sqn Ldr, or a Colonel and a Brigadier, or a Rear Admiral and a Vice Admiral. Most officers don’t know their basic pay. Okay, ask an officer’s spouse. He or she wouldn’t know it at all, they just know the amount that gets credited each month's end.  Ask her about the difference in rank and privileges, and she may tell you about the difference in Aiguillettes also. That is because the fauj is all about rank and appointment and honour and responsibility and leadership.

It was not and never will be about pay.

         I admit that there was a period, especially during the end 90s. That was the time when there was an aviation boom in the country when a reasonable number of transport and fighter pilots contemplated Premature Separation from Service. (Yes ma’am, that is the correct nomenclature, not VRS and not PMR) Statistics exist to show that those who left were again, officers who knew they were not making it due to a variety of factors. Rare was the High Alpha Shooting Star Fighter Pilot who quit command of a Mirage Squadron and went off to fly an ATF for Kingfisher. The larger numbers were transport and helicopter pilots who had not been cleared for command and who were not going to become Group Captains.

So if you got superceded, you quit and it was the deep hurt of not being able to put on your next rank or get your next command- and not then, not now not ever, about your paygrade.

         And if you left, it was to bow out gracefully, almost always.

         That brings me to the vexing question. Surely you don’t want a substantially large number of passed-over, demotivated officers holding onto ranks till they superannuate. Then do you not want them to retire gracefully? Or would you rather that they hold onto the rank of a select Colonel or Gp Capt for another seven years after being superceded.

         Faced with seven years more to superannuation to get that elusive OROP, to me his decision is a given. I am certain he will doff his hat and bid adieu to the OROP that he may get on superannuation, hang up his uniform and fade away. The only issue is, that you, in the service and you in the government took unfair advantage of his state of despair.

Let them retire gracefully and with OROP.

         

A Thousand Words

Life was oh so cool that time! I was flying Mi-17 helicopters with the Siachen Tigers in good ol’ Bari. With air maintenance tasks nearly over for the month, the only thing to do was pick teeth after a gigantic breakfast. So that very innocuous task to “Just, sling that darn engine out of a rice field”, was welcome.

Little did I know!

Sometime earlier in that November of 2003, a MiG 21 trainer aircraft on downwind at Bagdogra had flamed out. Making sure that the aircraft would crash in an uninhabited area, both pilots ejected safely. Some superb reflexes and high-quality training apart, thank God for that!

The Court of Inquiry blamed the HAL serviced engine. Something that the HAL suits fiercely disagreed. They asked for a strip examination of the engine at Koraput (I think). Now, the R-3 engine weighs one and a half tons. It was sunk in a flooded rice field. No crane could go into that slush to pick it up. The station offered to drag it over the 30 odd metres to the road. The suits agreed only too readily. Luckily, the Presiding Officer smelt a rat. Digging into earlier files, he found out that this was an oft used ploy. After testing, the suits would argue that the engine was damaged by the dragging. The test would be inconclusive and the HAL would be home and free.

The Cheetah Commanding Officer (CO) at Baghdogra suggested that he could fly over to the site, hover and sling the engine out. A quick call to the Command and they said, "Sure thing". When he attempted to sling it out, he was in for a rude shock. The darn engine was too close to the trees and electrical wires. A few game attempts and he gave up wisely.

And that’s how this shitload sortie landed up on our plate.

Our crew composition was good. While I held an A MG, I was pretty new to the east. So to compensate, there was my Co Joe, a rustic Jat lad with bags of experience in the Eastern Air Force. His hands could make a helicopter dance. Co Joe loved to talk and in a language peppered with delightful and quaint swear words with that typical harsh accent. The Flight Engineer was a fearless Bong. Psycho and I had served together in Kargil. He thought nothing of crawling onto the saddle of a Mi-17, with the ROTORS ROTATING! Finally, as Flight Gunner, I had an experienced Sergeant. The Glacier, deserts, the East, Toughie had operated everywhere.

We had a small powwow. Let’s plan wheels-roll at sunrise, I said. Ferry to Baghdogra and do a ground recce the same evening. Fly the under-slung sortie the next day. Wrap it up and dash back home for the weekend. That’s when the CO’s orderly came to me. In that typical mysterious way with that typical horrible sinister smile, something all CO’s Orderlies get trained in a special course in some secret darn place, he told me that the old man had enquired if I may be inclined to find the time to see him. 

Inclined? Find the time? Fucking, when the CO calls, you fucking hop, run and jump, and all at the same time. 

Now our CO was an all-knowing, benevolent, and battle-hardened decorated old warhorse. He’d been everywhere and done everything. He asked me about my plan. I laid it out straight and simple. He smiled and asked, “Would you like to take another Gunner, one of those rookies?” I bobbed my head and said that it was the most brilliant piece of advice anyone had ever received, including the verses of the Holy Book. Deep inside I thought, damn, why another guy? 

I realized the value of this piece of advice later on.

Co Joe made sure we got to Baghdogra uneventfully. We saw land the odd time en route to Guwahati. We even managed to avoid rain in some places. All pretty humdrum for the place and time of the year. 

The station was all geared up. The Chief Operations Officer was a Jalebi Jock. A nice guy, but pretty sceptical since he had seen the Cheetah’s failed attempt. The Station Flight Safety Officer was a mud crawler, like us. He briefed us and then suggested a ground recce. 

We went in a Gypsy and saw the place and damn, reality hit us. The engine was lying on the edge of a flooded field, surrounded by trees and squeezed tighter than a rat’s ar*e by wires. I sat down on the nearby road, dumbstruck. Co Joe too for once is silent when Psycho Bong says, “I think it can be done”. I raise my eyebrows. Toughie adds, “Yeah we could make an approach from the side and do a real high hover. I’ll then talk you down”. Rookie chips in with, “Sure thing, I can crawl to that place and hook up the sling when you get down.” Psycho then says, “Could be just a little tight, but it’s a doable thing”. 

Co Joe now finds his voice and says, “BC, G may danda dalwaney ka shauk hain to phir mota patla kya dekhna”. There is no way that I can accurately translate this piece of typical Haryanavi philosophy. It means that if you love to shove a stick up your ar*e, why worry about the thickness. I nodded furiously and squeezed out a, “Yeah, that’s the Josh, guys”.

It was dark by the time we got back. Downed the customary two large, ate the standard scramble eggs with Paruts (that’s the cool way to describe parathas). The air conditioning in the rooms was noisy but effective. We fought back with lusty snoring for those eight hours of beauty sleep. The next day we chatted some more about the sortie seriously, very very seriously. Then we got airborne.

A picture, they say is worth a thousand words. The word count is now exactly that. Let these ten pictures talk. 

We set up a hover a*se-ways to the damn wires because of strong winds. Rookie is sitting at the white spot in the centre.

Rookie comes crawling through slush under the downwash and attaches the sling to the cables wound around the engine. The blessed engine up, I turn cross for a circuit.

Gingerly, I approach the truck, Co Joe is whistling while looking for poles, wires, damn everything.

Steady now, says Toughie

Steady now, says Toughie

DCO

The engine is back at the base.

Exactly on the tires, not bad, huh?

Hmm, not bad at all.