The Bomber Need Not Always Get Through

 

 

Breaking the Will of the Enemy

 

Surprisingly, the phrase ‘the bomber will always get through’ was made not by an airman but by a seasoned and successful three-time British Prime Minister. In his 1932 speech, "A Fear for the Future", Stanley Baldwin, 1st Earl Baldwin of Bewdley, warned the British parliament that a strategic bombing campaign would destroy a country's cities and ‘kill large numbers of men and women’, breaking the ‘will of a people to fight’ leading to ultimate victory.

 

This was in consonance with the classic Air Power theorists of the early part of the 20^th Century. They too were almost of the same opinion that in a ‘total war’ against the enemy state, offensive air operations with extensive use of bombing campaigns would break the will of the enemy state. While there was considerable difference on the targets, Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchel were in near total agreement on employing long-range heavy bombers delivering ordnance in mass.

 

Obscurity for the Bomber

 

Bombing Campaigns

 

The studies of the bombing campaigns through the ages reveal that ‘the bomber did not always get through’. Whilst the development of radar gave fore warning of incoming raids, severe attrition was caused by enemy fighters and AAA (Anti-Aircraft Artillery). Difficulties in navigation and inaccuracy due to rudimentary sighting systems required a very large Over Target Requirement (OTR). The Luftwaffe’s bombing campaign of London did not break ‘the will of the people’ and instead steeled their resolve to fight back. A 1964 British study of V bombers indicated that unprotected bombers would encounter 6 AAMs,(Air to Air Missiles) each with a 75% probability of destruction. A similar result came from a USAF study on the efficacy of bombers versus missiles (msl).

 

Bombing campaigns in general and the bomber in particular seemed to be headed for obscurity.

 

Shock and Awe

 

That obscurity reigned until the coming together of the technologies of intelligence gathering, precision targeting, stealth and SEAD, and perhaps more importantly, an operational level concept. The result was Operation Desert Storm. This operational concept focused principally on ‘effects’ to achieve and exert ‘control’ over an opponent, rather than destruction to achieve military objectives. Col John Warden used this near perfect opportunity to lay the foundation for a complete reversal of the disastrous Rolling Thunder of the Vietnam era with Instant Thunder; a campaign to target the Five Rings of the Centres of Gravity (CoG) of Saddam’s regime. As then Brig Gen David A Deptula wrote “The first night of the Gulf War air campaign demonstrated that the conduct of war had changed. One hundred fifty-two discrete targets—plus regular Iraqi Army forces and SAM (Surface to Air Msl) sites—made up the master attack plan for the opening 24-hour period of the Gulf air war. The Gulf War began with more targets in one day’s attack plan than the total number of targets hit by the entire Eighth Air Force in all of 1942 and 19434—more separate target air attacks in 24 hours than ever before in the history of warfare.”

 

Parallel warfare had arrived.

 

Some Thoughts on Strategy and Effects

 

Strategy and Tactics

 

A bomber traditionally has always been a multi-engine long-range aircraft that could deliver heavy ordnance. So, when does it become strategic?

 

The term ‘strategy’ has been perennially concerned with operations at a markedly different level from tactics. Carl Von Clausewitz wrote six volumes and two drafts for his treatise ‘On War’. Had he lived to complete this classic, he would perhaps have elaborated more on strategy. As it is, Clausewitz has very little to say about this even in Book Three on strategy. Strategy, he defines baldly as "the use of the engagement for the purposes of the war".

 

Technological advancements in aviation have blurred the differences between strategy and tactics considerably. Gen Charles A. Horner, the JACC (Joint Air Component Commander) during Op Desert Storm put this quite simply, “I don’t understand tactical or strategic. The words have now become meaningless and dysfunctional. In fact, in modern military speech, they are more often used to divide people and frustrate efforts than to illuminate and facilitate.”

Closer home, the Basic Doctrine of the IAF published in 2012, defines strategy as the process of coordinating the development, deployment, and employment of military forces to achieve national security objectives.

 

The IAF understands strategy and Effect Focussed Operations only too well even if it doesn’t articulate it elaborately. On 14 Dec 1971, IAF struck the Governor’s House in Dacca, with four MiG 21 and two Hunter aircrafts. Firing 128 rockets and guns, it terrorised the East Pakistan leadership into surrender. The innermost ring of Command, Control and Leadership had been struck and forced to capitulate.

As can be seen, a weapon and a platform can be strategic or tactical. What matters is the effect.

Current Heavy Bombers

 

Only three nations operate heavy bombers today. USAF has its B-52 Stratofortress, B-1B and B-2 aircrafts. Russia operates the Tu-22, Tu-160 and the Tu-195 while PRC (People’s Republic of China) operates several versions of the Tu-16 designating it as versions of H-6; H-6 K being the latest version.

 

All other Air Forces operate the fighter bomber or multi-role fighter jets.

 

Bombers versus Missiles

 

Comparisons between penetrating bombers and expendable missiles are inevitable. While public perception favours missiles and this is a view often shared by some in the military, Project AIR FORCE (RAND) carried out a study that was starkly revealing.

 

The Project developed life cycle costs estimates (including procurement, operations, and support) for a new bomber. This included the per day cost of fighting multiple conflicts against adversaries possessing moderate air defences. The project also developed cost estimates of long-range cruise missile design launched from standoff distances by non-stealthy platforms.  The project did not include the procurement costs for the missile launch platforms. It also assumed that cruise missiles do not require more ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) support than bombers. Both of these factors worked in the favour of the cost analysis of missiles.

 

Project Air Force’s calculations showed that if a nation fights under these conditions for 20 days or more, over the next 30 years, penetrating stealth bombers cost less than expendable missiles for similar missions.

 

The Future Bombers

 

USA

 

Budgets force a nation to allocate its monies judiciously. USAF will induct the B-21 Raider (named after the famous Doolittle Raid) in the next decade. To be built at a staggering cost of US$ 550 million apiece with a staggering US$ 100 billion-dollar R&D budget, the B 21 will be a long-range, highly survivable bomber capable of carrying a mix of conventional and nuclear ordnance.

 

Russia

 

The Tupolev Design Bureau is currently developing a long range stealthy subsonic heavy bomber called PAK DA codenamed Poslannik (Envoy). While a full-scale wooden mock-up has been revealed, there is considerable criticism in the West whether Russia will have the resources to continue this programme. This is in light of the economic sanctions due to the Ukraine crisis.

 

PRC

 

PRC is working on inducting its newest and most powerful bomber, the H-20. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) describes the bomber as being a heavy and stealthy plane, capable of flying across the Pacific with a 45-ton weapon payload. The SCMP quotes sources in China as saying the bomber will have a range of at least 12,000 kilometres, which would even put Hawaii within its reach.

 

 

 

Threat Perception according to India

 

The PRC’s paramount consideration in the use of force has been whether it advances or protects China’s vital national interests. Analysis reveals that PRC uses armed force for three fundamental reasons.

The first is to defend its vital national interests. To elaborate, it seeks to protect sovereignty, safeguard and advance territorial claims, or promote national unification. This rationale is evident from China’s actions vis-à-vis Taiwan and in the East and South China seas.

The next reason is to signal deterrence or coercion to an adversary. Across decades, China has made sustained efforts to coerce Taiwan towards unification and not pursue independence. PRC’s often attempts to “teach a lesson” to its adversary. This was the clear logic of the 1962 war with India.  

The third and perhaps last reason is for non-warfighting operations. The prime example is Beijing’s decision to increase its participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

The PRC used force judiciously. Beijing strategically embraces the measured application of force, whereas operationally, the PLA attempts mass concentration of force to achieve overwhelming superiority at the point of attack. Prime examples of this are Doklam and Galwan.

Bomber Flights

In September 2013, a PLA naval aviation H-6 bomber flew past the First Island Chain for the first time, while the air force began sending its H-6 K variant on overwater training missions in March 2015, including some that circumnavigated Taiwan. Chinese air force overwater bomber training flights are a linchpin of China’s development of a “strategic air force” that can conduct offshore missions for deterrent and warfighting purposes and provide valuable training for Chinese pilots to simulate raids on key targets. By leveraging a mix of PLA doctrinal publications and publicly reported flight details, PLAAF concepts of “bomber strike packages” are discernible.

Threat from PLAAF Bombers

 

PLAAF operates three Bomber Air Divisions (8^th, 10^th. & 36^th) of the H-6 (Tu-16 Badger) medium bomber. All bomber aircraft of PLAAF are called Hong meaning bomber or fire or even fury. Each division has two regiments of two squadrons of ten aircraft each.  Each regiment must also have a training squadron of CJ-6 trainers, as per PLAAF SOP.

H-6 bombers and tankers have operated together three times in 2002. Hence, it is very well possible that some H-6 can be refuelled. 

PLAAF has based most of its H-6 aircraft catering for the Taiwan, Russian and US contingencies. However, a few have also been based at Kashgar and Hotan to cater to our border conflict. In an attempt to posture, Chinese media showed an H-6 flight over the Himalayas, one that was easily called out as fake.

That said the H-6 K has impressive capabilities. Its powerplant is the new Soloviev D-30KP-2 turbofan engines. The cabin was replaced with a radome. Composite materials have been used reducing its weight. The newest version has significantly improved avionics, search and attack radar, navigation, fire control, and weapon precision capabilities. The aircraft has ejection seats reportedly for all four crew members. With a combat radius of 3500 km, armed with ALCMs, the H-6 K has a combat range of almost 5000 km. It is also capable of being armed with a mix of up to 12 tons of free fall bombs or 6 LGBs of the Luoyang Electro-Optics Technology (LT) Precision Guided Bomb (PGB) class.

This brings all of the Indian sub-continent within its combat range whilst still being within its air defended zone.

IAF has developed measures to counter this using a mix of Airborne assets and Ground Based Guided Weapons. The elaboration is beyond the scope of this article.

Options for India

 

Brief History of IAF Bombers

 

The first ever bombing operations in IAF were carried out by the legendary Jumbo Majumdar against the Japanese in WW II. IAF’s professionalism and gallantry stood out during the war resulting in it being bestowed the ‘Royal’ title.

 

Be that as it may, the British were not inclined to induct bombers into the RIAF given their distrust and animosity to Indian ambitions of building an Air Force. Whilst leaving India, the RAF attempted to destroy the Consolidated B-24 Liberators that it was operating in India. Post-Independence, IAF’s engineers did a remarkable job restoring the abandoned and severely damaged B-24 Liberators. Sixteen aircraft were restored and 5 Squadron IAF was raised.

 

The British also influenced IAF political leadership against procuring bombers. Prof PMS Blackett was an important member of Britain’s Operation Research Organisation that carried out significant improvements in raising combat effectiveness. Appointed as an Advisor to the Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru, he advocated strongly against procuring and operating bombers. The use of bombers by IAF would invite swift and strong retribution, he advised.

In the 1950s, the Soviet Union offered the Ilyushin IL-28. The fact that this deal didn’t materialise would return to haunt us in 1962. PLAAF acquired this very same IL-28 in the 50s. Under fear of PLAAF attacking Indian cities with these very IL-28 bombers, the Indian leadership refused to use the IAF in an offensive role. IAF leadership also did not cover itself in glory and acquiesced to this ignominy.

Less than a decade later, India acquired the English Electric Canberra 54 B (I) bombers. The Canberras were consigned to reconnaissance missions in 1962. They were employed in airfield attack as well as interdiction missions in both the Indo-Pak wars. Strangely, after the Canberras moved to other roles, IAF never pursued procurement of bombers. It instead went for the fighter strike way. But more on that later.

Why Doesn’t IAF have a Contemporary Bomber?

Perhaps, the single most important reason is financial resources. Our political relations with the USA and erst while Soviet Union also influenced thought and thinking.

The IAF was born as a small tactical Air Force. The induction of the DPSA Jaguar in 1979 was its first attempt to acquire long range strike capability. The subsequent induction of the MiG 23 BN and the MiG 27 in 1984-85 added to IAF’s strike capability. Perhaps the greatest fillip came with the induction of the multi role Su-30.

That said, there are ideological issues as well. The IAF leadership takes immense pride in being fighter pilots and rightly so. But even life-long dedicated FSL qualified pilots will introduce themselves as fighter pilots. And while several Jaguar pilots have reached the apex, associating themselves with the less glamorous role of bombing would border on anathema.

Advantages of a Bomber Force

The advantages of having a dedicated bomber force are immense and only too obvious.

A legacy long-range heavy bomber operates with a crew of say 4 or five members. This includes a pilot, co-pilot, a navigator/bombardier, flight engineer and an observer. With an armament of around 15 tons and/or up to eight ALCMs, it can deliver a potent amount of ordnance. This would reduce the OTR for any strategic targets. It is extremely costly to train a fighter pilots as compared to other crew. The cost benefits of using bombers as against only strike aircraft are obvious.

There are other important effects of having such a strategic asset. PLAAF over water bomber flights have resulted in Japan having to maintain 24/7 Operation readiness Platforms of interceptors. In our context, PLAAF would have to maintain such ORPs as well even in its rear bases.

If we possess a bomber fleet that is capable of striking the TAR rail hubs, or Logistical nodes in the interior or PLAAF rear bases, there will be a need for PLAAF to reorganise their assets and bases.

Developing a Bomber

No nation sells a bomber aircraft. That is with the exception of the erstwhile USSR and the present Russian Federation. Indian aviation design and development are nowhere near designing and developing a contemporary long-range stealth bomber. It is suggested that for the interim period IAF must acquire two squadrons of 10 aircraft each.

There is a lot of commonality between developing a bomber and an airliner. India must develop these capabilities. The staggering cost of development would then be shared between these two programmes. The programmes must also involve other nations such as Japan and South Korea who share similar concerns.

There is considerable experience within India for equipping the bomber with avionics, and protection suites. The wealth of knowledge gained during the development of the Tejas will serve us well. Added to this is our knowledge and experience in developing and producing air launched cruise missiles of the BrahMos class. Using a platform such as a heavy bomber, the next generation of Indian ALCMs could very well reach 1500 km.

This would mean that the Bomber Force while remaining within own air defended zone would not need to go through enemy air defended zones and still strike their vital and strategic targets.

The bomber need not always go through.

Operating the Bomber

IAF has for the past 15 years developed and refined tactics for large force packages and engagements. It has honed its procedures and tactics for defending and protecting its Flight Refueller Aircraft and AWACs. These exercises have involved most leading airpowers of the world and have been evaluated in great detail.  Therefore, the expertise and experience in protecting and escorting a bomber is available.

A heavy bomber has considerable ECM capability since by design there is electrical power and space to house and operate AI/ML enabled Radar Warning Receivers and software enabled agile Jammers. In addition, the bombers would have additional EW Escorts, Air Defence Escorts, Decoys, and UAVs. Finally, there would be BDA aircraft and/or UAV.

Conclusion

The answer to the question that should IAF have a dedicated long range bomber force is a resounding yes. The devil lies as always in the details. Convey’s Time Management Matrix brings us some measure of understanding. The Indian political leadership is perpetually occupied with priorities that are of a more-immediate nature. In such a scenario, a long-term procurement often takes a back seat. However, IAF cannot wash its hands of this important issue. The dark days of 1962 must never visit us again. It must strive to convince the leadership of the need to allocate resources and procure this vital strategic asset.

So, the answer to the question that will we ever get the dedicated long range bomber force must also be a resounding yes.