The Bomber Need Not
Always Get Through
Breaking the Will of
the Enemy
Surprisingly, the phrase ‘the bomber will always
get through’ was made not by an airman but by a seasoned and successful three-time
British Prime Minister. In his 1932 speech, "A Fear for the Future", Stanley
Baldwin, 1st Earl Baldwin of Bewdley, warned the British parliament that a strategic
bombing campaign would destroy a country's cities and ‘kill large numbers of
men and women’, breaking the ‘will of a people to fight’ leading to ultimate
victory.
This was in consonance with the classic Air Power
theorists of the early part of the 20th Century. They too were
almost of the same opinion that in a ‘total war’ against the enemy state,
offensive air operations with extensive use of bombing campaigns would break
the will of the enemy state. While there was considerable difference on the
targets, Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchel were in near total agreement on employing
long-range heavy bombers delivering ordnance in mass.
Obscurity for the
Bomber
Bombing Campaigns
The studies of the bombing campaigns through the
ages reveal that ‘the bomber did not always get through’. Whilst the
development of radar gave fore warning of incoming raids, severe attrition was caused
by enemy fighters and AAA (Anti-Aircraft Artillery). Difficulties in navigation
and inaccuracy due to rudimentary sighting systems required a very large Over
Target Requirement (OTR). The Luftwaffe’s bombing campaign of London did not
break ‘the will of the people’ and instead steeled their resolve to fight back.
A 1964 British study of V bombers indicated that unprotected bombers would
encounter 6 AAMs,(Air to Air Missiles) each with a 75% probability of
destruction. A similar result came from a USAF study on the efficacy of bombers
versus missiles (msl).
Bombing campaigns in general and the bomber in
particular seemed to be headed for obscurity.
Shock and Awe
That obscurity reigned until the coming together of
the technologies of intelligence gathering, precision targeting, stealth and SEAD,
and perhaps more importantly, an operational level concept. The result was Operation
Desert Storm. This operational concept focused principally on ‘effects’ to achieve
and exert ‘control’ over an opponent, rather than destruction to achieve
military objectives. Col John Warden used this near perfect opportunity to lay
the foundation for a complete reversal of the disastrous Rolling Thunder of the
Vietnam era with Instant Thunder; a campaign to target the Five Rings of the Centres
of Gravity (CoG) of Saddam’s regime. As then Brig Gen David A Deptula wrote “The
first night of the Gulf War air campaign demonstrated that the conduct of war
had changed. One hundred fifty-two discrete targets—plus regular Iraqi Army
forces and SAM (Surface to Air Msl) sites—made up the master attack plan for
the opening 24-hour period of the Gulf air war. The Gulf War began with more
targets in one day’s attack plan than the total number of targets hit by the
entire Eighth Air Force in all of 1942 and 19434—more separate target air
attacks in 24 hours than ever before in the history of warfare.”
Parallel warfare had arrived.
Some Thoughts on
Strategy and Effects
Strategy and Tactics
A bomber traditionally has always been a multi-engine
long-range aircraft that could deliver heavy ordnance. So, when does it become
strategic?
The term ‘strategy’ has been perennially concerned
with operations at a markedly different level from tactics. Carl Von Clausewitz
wrote six volumes and two drafts for his treatise ‘On War’. Had he lived to
complete this classic, he would perhaps have elaborated more on strategy. As it
is, Clausewitz has very little to say about this even in Book Three on
strategy. Strategy, he defines baldly as "the use of the engagement for the
purposes of the war".
Technological advancements in
aviation have blurred the differences between strategy and tactics considerably.
Gen Charles A. Horner, the JACC (Joint Air Component Commander) during Op Desert
Storm put this quite simply, “I don’t understand tactical or strategic. The
words have now become meaningless and dysfunctional. In fact, in modern
military speech, they are more often used to divide people and frustrate
efforts than to illuminate and facilitate.”
Closer home, the Basic Doctrine of the IAF
published in 2012, defines strategy as the process of coordinating the
development, deployment, and employment of military forces to achieve national
security objectives.
The IAF understands strategy and
Effect Focussed Operations only too well even if it doesn’t articulate it elaborately.
On 14 Dec 1971, IAF struck the Governor’s House in Dacca, with four MiG 21 and two
Hunter aircrafts. Firing 128 rockets and guns, it terrorised the East Pakistan
leadership into surrender. The innermost ring of Command, Control and Leadership
had been struck and forced to capitulate.
As can be seen, a weapon and a
platform can be strategic or tactical. What matters is the effect.
Current Heavy Bombers
Only three nations operate heavy bombers today.
USAF has its B-52 Stratofortress, B-1B and B-2 aircrafts. Russia operates the
Tu-22, Tu-160 and the Tu-195 while PRC (People’s Republic of China) operates
several versions of the Tu-16 designating it as versions of H-6; H-6 K being
the latest version.
All other Air Forces operate the fighter bomber or
multi-role fighter jets.
Bombers versus Missiles
Comparisons between penetrating bombers and
expendable missiles are inevitable. While public perception favours missiles
and this is a view often shared by some in the military, Project AIR FORCE (RAND)
carried out a study that was starkly revealing.
The Project developed life cycle costs estimates (including
procurement, operations, and support) for a new bomber. This included the per
day cost of fighting multiple conflicts against adversaries possessing moderate
air defences. The project also developed cost estimates of long-range cruise
missile design launched from standoff distances by non-stealthy platforms. The project did not include the procurement
costs for the missile launch platforms. It also assumed that cruise missiles do
not require more ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) support than
bombers. Both of these factors worked in the favour of the cost analysis of
missiles.
Project Air Force’s calculations showed that if a
nation fights under these conditions for 20 days or more, over the next 30
years, penetrating stealth bombers cost less than expendable missiles for similar
missions.
The Future Bombers
USA
Budgets force a nation to allocate its monies
judiciously. USAF will induct the B-21 Raider (named after the famous Doolittle
Raid) in the next decade. To be built at a staggering cost of US$ 550 million
apiece with a staggering US$ 100 billion-dollar R&D budget, the B 21 will
be a long-range, highly survivable bomber capable of carrying a mix of
conventional and nuclear ordnance.
Russia
The Tupolev Design Bureau is currently developing a
long range stealthy subsonic heavy bomber called PAK DA codenamed Poslannik
(Envoy). While a full-scale wooden mock-up has been revealed, there is
considerable criticism in the West whether Russia will have the resources to
continue this programme. This is in light of the economic sanctions due to the
Ukraine crisis.
PRC
PRC is working on inducting
its newest and most powerful bomber, the H-20. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) describes the
bomber as being a heavy and stealthy plane, capable of flying across the
Pacific with a 45-ton weapon payload. The SCMP quotes sources in China as
saying the bomber will have a range of at least 12,000 kilometres, which would
even put Hawaii within its reach.
Threat Perception according to India
The PRC’s paramount
consideration in the use of force has been whether it advances or protects
China’s vital national interests. Analysis reveals that PRC uses armed force for
three fundamental reasons.
The first is to defend its vital
national interests. To elaborate, it seeks to protect sovereignty, safeguard
and advance territorial claims, or promote national unification. This rationale
is evident from China’s actions vis-à-vis Taiwan and in the East and South
China seas.
The next reason is to signal deterrence
or coercion to an adversary. Across decades, China has made sustained efforts to
coerce Taiwan towards unification and not pursue independence. PRC’s often
attempts to “teach a lesson” to its adversary. This was the clear logic of the
1962 war with India.
The third and perhaps last
reason is for non-warfighting operations. The prime example is Beijing’s
decision to increase its participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.
The PRC used force judiciously. Beijing
strategically embraces the measured application of force, whereas
operationally, the PLA attempts mass concentration of force to achieve
overwhelming superiority at the point of attack. Prime examples of this are Doklam
and Galwan.
Bomber Flights
In September 2013, a PLA naval
aviation H-6 bomber flew past the First Island Chain for the first time, while
the air force began sending its H-6 K variant on overwater training missions in
March 2015, including some that circumnavigated Taiwan. Chinese air force
overwater bomber training flights are a linchpin of China’s development of a
“strategic air force” that can conduct offshore missions for deterrent and
warfighting purposes and provide valuable training for Chinese pilots to
simulate raids on key targets. By leveraging a mix of PLA doctrinal
publications and publicly reported flight details, PLAAF concepts of “bomber
strike packages” are discernible.
Threat from PLAAF Bombers
PLAAF operates three
Bomber Air Divisions (8th, 10th. & 36th)
of the H-6 (Tu-16 Badger) medium bomber. All bomber aircraft of PLAAF are
called Hong meaning bomber or fire or even fury. Each division has two
regiments of two squadrons of ten aircraft each. Each regiment must also
have a training squadron of CJ-6 trainers, as per PLAAF SOP.
H-6 bombers and
tankers have operated together three times in 2002. Hence, it is very well
possible that some H-6 can be refuelled.
PLAAF has based most
of its H-6 aircraft catering for the Taiwan, Russian and US contingencies.
However, a few have also been based at Kashgar and Hotan to cater to our border
conflict. In an attempt to posture, Chinese media showed an H-6 flight over the
Himalayas, one that was easily called out as fake.
That said the H-6 K
has impressive capabilities. Its powerplant is the new Soloviev D-30KP-2
turbofan engines. The cabin was replaced with a radome. Composite materials have
been used reducing its weight. The newest version has significantly improved
avionics, search and attack radar, navigation, fire control, and weapon
precision capabilities. The aircraft has ejection seats reportedly for all four
crew members. With a combat radius of 3500 km, armed with ALCMs, the H-6 K has
a combat range of almost 5000 km. It is also capable of being armed with a mix
of up to 12 tons of free fall bombs or 6 LGBs of the Luoyang Electro-Optics
Technology (LT) Precision Guided Bomb (PGB) class.
This brings all of
the Indian sub-continent within its combat range whilst still being within its air
defended zone.
IAF has developed
measures to counter this using a mix of Airborne assets and Ground Based Guided
Weapons. The elaboration is beyond the scope of this article.
Options for India
Brief History of IAF Bombers
The first ever bombing operations in IAF were carried out by the
legendary Jumbo Majumdar against the Japanese in WW II. IAF’s professionalism
and gallantry stood out during the war resulting in it being bestowed the
‘Royal’ title.
Be that as it may, the British were not inclined to induct
bombers into the RIAF given their distrust and animosity to Indian ambitions of
building an Air Force. Whilst leaving India, the RAF attempted to destroy the
Consolidated B-24 Liberators that it was operating in India. Post-Independence,
IAF’s engineers did a remarkable job restoring the abandoned and severely
damaged B-24 Liberators. Sixteen aircraft were restored and 5 Squadron IAF was
raised.
The British
also influenced IAF political leadership against procuring bombers. Prof PMS
Blackett was an important member of Britain’s Operation Research Organisation
that carried out significant improvements in raising combat effectiveness.
Appointed as an Advisor to the Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru, he advocated
strongly against procuring and operating bombers. The use of bombers by IAF
would invite swift and strong retribution, he advised.
In the 1950s, the Soviet Union
offered the Ilyushin IL-28. The fact that this deal didn’t materialise would
return to haunt us in 1962. PLAAF acquired this very same IL-28 in the 50s. Under fear of PLAAF attacking Indian cities with
these very IL-28 bombers, the Indian leadership refused to use the IAF in an
offensive role. IAF leadership also did not cover itself in glory and
acquiesced to this ignominy.
Less than a decade later, India acquired
the English Electric Canberra 54 B (I) bombers. The Canberras were consigned to
reconnaissance missions in 1962. They were employed in airfield attack as well
as interdiction missions in both the Indo-Pak wars. Strangely, after the
Canberras moved to other roles, IAF never pursued procurement of bombers. It
instead went for the fighter strike way. But more on that later.
Why Doesn’t IAF have a Contemporary Bomber?
Perhaps, the single most important
reason is financial resources. Our political relations with the USA and erst
while Soviet Union also influenced thought and thinking.
The IAF was born as a small tactical
Air Force. The induction of the DPSA Jaguar in 1979 was its first attempt to
acquire long range strike capability. The subsequent induction of the MiG 23 BN
and the MiG 27 in 1984-85 added to IAF’s strike capability. Perhaps the
greatest fillip came with the induction of the multi role Su-30.
That said, there are ideological
issues as well. The IAF leadership takes immense pride in being fighter pilots
and rightly so. But even life-long dedicated FSL qualified pilots will
introduce themselves as fighter pilots. And while several Jaguar pilots have
reached the apex, associating themselves with the less glamorous role of
bombing would border on anathema.
Advantages of a Bomber Force
The advantages of having a
dedicated bomber force are immense and only too obvious.
A legacy long-range heavy bomber
operates with a crew of say 4 or five members. This includes a pilot, co-pilot,
a navigator/bombardier, flight engineer and an observer. With an armament of
around 15 tons and/or up to eight ALCMs, it can deliver a potent amount of
ordnance. This would reduce the OTR for any strategic targets. It is extremely
costly to train a fighter pilots as compared to other crew. The cost benefits
of using bombers as against only strike aircraft are obvious.
There are other important
effects of having such a strategic asset. PLAAF over water bomber flights have
resulted in Japan having to maintain 24/7 Operation readiness Platforms of interceptors.
In our context, PLAAF would have to maintain such ORPs as well even in its rear
bases.
If we possess a bomber fleet
that is capable of striking the TAR rail hubs, or Logistical nodes in the
interior or PLAAF rear bases, there will be a need for PLAAF to reorganise
their assets and bases.
Developing a Bomber
No nation sells a bomber
aircraft. That is with the exception of the erstwhile USSR and the present
Russian Federation. Indian aviation design and development are nowhere near
designing and developing a contemporary long-range stealth bomber. It is
suggested that for the interim period IAF must acquire two squadrons of 10
aircraft each.
There is a lot of commonality
between developing a bomber and an airliner. India must develop these
capabilities. The staggering cost of development would then be shared between
these two programmes. The programmes must also involve other nations such as
Japan and South Korea who share similar concerns.
There is considerable experience
within India for equipping the bomber with avionics, and protection suites. The
wealth of knowledge gained during the development of the Tejas will serve us
well. Added to this is our knowledge and experience in developing and producing
air launched cruise missiles of the BrahMos class. Using a platform such as a
heavy bomber, the next generation of Indian ALCMs could very well reach 1500
km.
This would mean that the Bomber
Force while remaining within own air defended zone would not need to go through
enemy air defended zones and still strike their vital and strategic targets.
The bomber need not always go
through.
Operating the Bomber
IAF has for the past 15 years
developed and refined tactics for large force packages and engagements. It has honed
its procedures and tactics for defending and protecting its Flight Refueller
Aircraft and AWACs. These exercises have involved most leading airpowers of the
world and have been evaluated in great detail. Therefore, the expertise and experience in
protecting and escorting a bomber is available.
A heavy bomber has considerable ECM capability since by
design there is electrical power and space to house and operate AI/ML enabled
Radar Warning Receivers and software enabled agile Jammers. In addition, the
bombers would have additional EW Escorts, Air Defence Escorts, Decoys, and
UAVs. Finally, there would be BDA aircraft and/or UAV.
Conclusion
The answer to the question that
should IAF have a dedicated long range bomber force is a resounding yes. The
devil lies as always in the details. Convey’s Time Management Matrix brings us
some measure of understanding. The Indian political leadership is perpetually
occupied with priorities that are of a more-immediate nature. In such a
scenario, a long-term procurement often takes a back seat. However, IAF cannot
wash its hands of this important issue. The dark days of 1962 must never visit
us again. It must strive to convince the leadership of the need to allocate
resources and procure this vital strategic asset.
So, the answer to the question that
will we ever get the dedicated long range bomber force must also be a
resounding yes.
