Post-Independence in 1947 the young Indian nation was redeeming its tryst with destiny: perhaps not fully and not in whole measure; after all the entire Radcliff award had to be tackled and the brutal fires of partition doused. Nation building and unification was underway, with the Junagadh and Hyderabad imbroglios having been solved. However, in the strategic state of Jammu and Kashmir the vacillating Maharaja Hari Singh naively dreamed of independence. This was quite contrary to the well meaning advice of Lord Mountbatten of joining either of the two nascent nations. At such a juncture Pakistan sought to force the Maharaja’s hand and forcibly annex the state. The fact that this was a planned step is amply illustrated by the presence of Jinnah’s private secretary in Srinagar. He was subsequently arrested and sent back to Pakistan.
It is with this backdrop that (then) Major EA Vas commences his personal account of operations in 1947-48. He begins by dismissing the legend of Babar “to push on without baggage”. He further essays that the wealth of India had always been legendary, if not fair game for successive invaders. The extravagant legends such as invading India for booty or land are cherished fondly (albeit wrongly) even today. The failure of the Pakistan’s Kargil adventure is a case in point.
The author covers the tactics and strategy of the Indian army in detail to combat the guerrilla warfare being practiced by the Pak army-backed raiders. He illustrates these with personal anecdotes when he covers the battles of Naoshera and the recapture of Jhangar. The detailed maps are of immense use for ease of understanding. The young Major may well have been writing these today: the use of ambush to counter terrorist raids, road opening to protect convoys and pickets and patrols to manage mountain warfare are standard practice. The use of civilian defence to complement the regular army and the selective use of armour is crucial to border management. The present day relevance of the young company commanders views written nearly five decades ago are striking. Particularly fascinating are his views on mountain warfare. The author adapts General Orde Wingate’s stronghold theory to mountain warfare. He proposes offensive domination of large mountainous areas by well-sited strongholds supported by air drops. The defences of this stronghold ought to be supplemented or substituted by air strikes in a co-ordinated fire-plan. Area domination would be afforded by aggressive patrolling. The fact that some of these are followed in today’s LoC management of “no-war, no-peace” make a military student believe in Nostrodamus. There is also a proposal for a combined arms air-infantry team to provide an offensive element for mountain defence, which merits study in the light of the air strikes on Tiger Hill. A proposal for a specialised corps for mountain warfare made in the early –fifties had been adopted by the Indian army after Siachen.
Of particular interest to airmen are the first-hand accounts of IAF operations. Dakotas sustaining the besieged garrison of Poonch, under fire and with battle damage; Tempests strafing enemy concentrations west of Chamb, bunker-busting at Bagla (Pir Badesar); a daring ‘un-official’ casevac from a make shift airstrip near ‘Samnot’ (North-East of Surankot); are but some amongst a sea of examples. This will be a welcome surprise to theorists who feel that joint-man-ship is a new buzz-word to the Indian armed forces.
An authentic account of the much forgotten ‘first round’, the book chronicles operations, prevalent tactics and strategy which were prevalent at that time. It also includes the author’s knowledgeable views on the complex issues of mountain warfare. The author has since published three other works. His style of writing has remained unchanged, forceful, direct and to the point. A disconcerting feature attributable to the publishers perhaps, is the large number of mistakes in typing and spelling. A second edition with these corrections, contemporary font and coloured maps will make this book compelling.
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